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 Abstract : This paper shows that the results of Bianco (2006) depend critically on the 
assumption that there are no difference between the intermediate goods share in final output, 
the returns of specialization and the degree of market power of monopolistic competitors. In 
this paper, we disentangle the market power parameter from the intermediate goods share in 
final output and the returns to specialization. The main result of this paper is the death of the 
inverted-U shape relationship between competition and growth. Indeed, we find a decreasing 
relationship between competition and growth which is due to the composition of two negative 
effects on growth : resource allocation and Schumpeterian effects. 
Keywords : Endogenous growth, Horizontal differentiation, Technological change, Imperfect 
competition. 
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1. Introduction 
Bianco (2006) studies the impact of competition in the intermediate goods sector on growth. 
He uses the Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) model in which he introduces a different assumption 
concerning the production of intermediate goods. Indeed, unlike Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) 
which assumes that one need one unit of final good to produce one unit of intermediate good, 
Bianco (2006) does the hypothesis that the firm has to use one unit of labor. This assumption 
which is called "resource allocation effect" implies that labor can be allocated between three 
sectors : final good, intermediate goods and research. The interplay between this effect and 
the traditional Schumpeterian effect allows to obtain an interesting result. Indeed, Bianco 
(2006) finds an inverted-U relationship between competition and growth. For low value of 
competition, more competition is beneficial to growth since it allows a better allocation of 
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resource without hampering that much innovation incentives. In this case, the resource 
allocation effect is bigger than the profit incentive effect. On the other hand, for high value of 
competition, more competition reduces strongly growth because of the reduction of profit. In 
this case, the profit incentive effect is bigger than the resource allocation effect. 
Among the assumptions used by Bianco (2006) to derive this result is that there are no 
differences between the intermediate goods share in final output, the returns to specialization 
and the degree of market power of monopolistic competitors. This leads to the natural 
question whether making such a difference to the model changes its predictions. In this note, 
we show that including this difference into the model developed by Bianco (2006) eliminates 
the result mentioned above. 
2. The model 
The model developed is based on Bianco (2006)
3
. The economy is structured by three sectors 
: final good sector, intermediate goods sector and R&D sector. The final output sector 
produces output that can be used for consumption using labor and intermediate goods. These 
are available in A varieties and are produced by employing only labor. The R&D sector 
creates the blueprints for new varieties of intermediate goods which are produced by 
employing labor and knowledge. These blueprints are sold to the intermediate goods sector. 
2.1 The final good sector 
In this sector, atomistic producers engage in perfect competition. Following Bianco (2007), 
the final good sector produces a composite good Y  by using all the ith type of intermediate 
goods ix  and labor YL . Production is given by : 
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where  ,   and   Є ]0,1] are three parameters. This production function allows us to 
disentangle the competition measured by the degree of market power of monopolistic 
competitors in the intermediate sector ( ), the intermediate goods share in final output   and 
the degree of returns from specialization  . In this sense, this model is a generalization of 
Bianco (2006) model. Indeed, we obtain the Bianco (2006) model by introducing the 
following constraints   =1- ,  =  in our model.  
If we normalize to one the price of the final good, the profit of the representative firm is given 
by : 
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where Yw  is the wage rate in the final good sector and ip  is the price of the ith intermediate 
good. Under perfect competition in the final output market and the factor inputs markets, the 
representative firm chooses intermediate goods and labor in order to maximize its profit 
taking prices as given and subject to its technological constraint. The first order conditions are 
the followings : 
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Equation (3) is the inverse demand function for the firm that produces the ith intermediate 
good whereas equation (4) characterizes the demand function of labor. 
2.2 The intermediate goods sector 
In the intermediate goods sector, producers engage in monopolistic competition. Each firm 
produces one horizontally differentiated intermediate good and has to buy a patented design 
before producing it. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Bianco (2006), we assume 
that each local intermediate monopolist has access to the same technology employing only 
labor il  : 
ii lx   .     (5) 
We suppose that firms behavior which produce intermediate goods is governed by the 
principle of profit maximization at given factor prices under a technological constraint. The 
profit function of firms is the following : 
iiiii lwxp   ,    (6) 
where iw   is wage rate in the intermediate goods sector. Using the first order condition, we 
obtain the price of the ith intermediate good : 

i
i
w
p  .     (7) 
At the symmetric equilibrium, all firms produce the same quantity of the intermediate good x
, face the same wage rate w  and by consequence fix the same price for their production p . 
The price is equal to a constant mark up over the marginal cost w . 
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Defining by 


0
dilL ii , the total amount of labor employed in the intermediate goods sector 
and under the assumption of symmetry among intermediate goods producers, we can rewrite 
the equation (5) as follows : 
N
L
x ii  .     (8) 
Finally, the profit function of the firm which produces the ith intermediate good is : 
  11)1( Aii LLA .      (9) 
2.3 The R&D sector 
There are competitive research firms undertaking R&D. Following Dinopoulos and 
Thompson (1999), we assume that new blueprints are produced using old blueprints A , an 
amount of R&D labor AL and the labor force  L  : 
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This formulation of the R&D production function allows us to eliminate easily scale effects. 
Because of the perfect competition in the R&D sector, we can obtain the real wage in this 
sector as a function of the profit flows associated to the latest intermediate in using the zero 
profit condition : 
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where Aw  represents the real wage earned by R&D labor. AP  is the real value of such a 
blueprint which is equal to : 
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where r  is the real interest rate. 
Given AP , the free entry condition leads to : 
L
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2.4 The consumer behavior 
The demand side is characterized by the representative household who consumes and supplies 
labor. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991), we assume that the utility function of this 
consumer is logarithmic
4
 : 
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where 
L
C
c   is per capita private consumption, 0  is the rate of pure time preference. The 
representative household is endowed with a quantity of labor L which grows at a constant rate 
n . The flow budget constraint for the household is : 
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where a  is the total wealth of the agent (measured in units of final good), w  is the wage rate 
per unit of labor service. From the maximization program of the consumer, the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a solution are given by the Keynes-Ramsey rule : 
 rgc ,     (16) 
and the transversality condition : 
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where 
t
  is the co-state variable. 
3. The equilibrium and the steady state 
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium and give some analytical characterizations of a 
balanced growth path. 
3.1 The equilibrium 
It is now possible to characterize the labor market equilibrium in the economy considered. On 
this market, because of the homogeneity and the perfect mobility across sectors, the arbitrage 
ensures that the wage rate that is earned by employees which work in the final good sector, 
intermediate goods sector or R&D sector is equal. As a result, the following three conditions 
must simultaneously be checked : 
                                                                                 1 AiY sss   ,                                                   (18) 
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where Ys , is  and As represent the shares of the total labor supply devoted respectively to 
final, intermediate goods production and research activity. 
Equation (18) is a resource constraint, saying that at any point in the time the sum of the labor 
demands coming from each activity must be equal to the total available fixed supply. 
Equation (19) and equation (20) state that the wage earned by one unit of labor is to be the 
same irrespective of the sector where that unit of labor is actually employed. 
We can characterize the product market equilibrium in the economy considered. Indeed, on 
this market, the firms produce a final good which can be consumed. Consequently, the 
following condition must be checked : 
CY  .     (21) 
Equation (21) is a resource constraint on the final good sector. 
3.2 The steady state 
At the steady state, all variables as Y , C , A , YL , iL , AL  and L  grow at a positive constant 
rate.  
Proposition 1 : If L grows at a positive and constant rate , then all the over variables grow at 
a positive rates : 
ALLY gggg iY   )1( ,                                                               (22) 
CY gg  ,                                                                 (23) 
AA sg  .                                                                (24) 
 
Proof. We substitute equation (8) into equation (1) then we log-differentiate the equation (1) 
and finally we obtain the equation (22). From the equilibrium on the product market, given by 
the equation (21), it’s easy to find the equation (23).From the definition of the R&D 
production function given by the equation (10), we obtain the equation (24).  
Using the previous equations, we can demonstrate the following steady state equilibrium 
values for the relevant variables of the model
56
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According to the equation (23), the real interest rate is constant. Equation (24), (25) and (26) 
give the amount of labor in each sector at the equilibrium. Equation (27) shows that the 
growth rate is a function of technological, preference parameters n,,   and competition .  
4. The relationship between product market competition and growth 
In this section, we study the long run relationship between competition and growth in the 
model presented above. Following most authors, we use the so-called Lerner Index to gauge 
the intensity of market power within a market. Such an index is defined by the ratio of price 
P  minus marginal cost CM  over price. Using the definition of a mark up CMMarkupP *  
and Lerner Index 
P
CMP 
, we can use the equation (7) to define a proxy of competition as 
follows
7
 : 
 )1( xLernerInde .     (28) 
We show that our simple generalization of Bianco (2006) model that consists in having the 
monopolistic mark-up in the intermediate goods sector, the intermediate goods share in the 
final output and the returns to specialization treated separately, the inverted U relationship 
between competition and growth no longer exists. 
Proposition 1  The relationship between competition and growth is negative for all positive 
values of  ,  , L  and   and   Є ]0,1[. 
Proof.   The proof is obtained by differentiated the equation (27) with respect to   : 
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As 0  et   Є ]0,1[ then the sign of the derivative is the same as the sign of 1 n . Or, 
0 n  then 01 n .  
In order to illustrate this result, we plot the equation (27) for different values of competition 
 , and returns to specialization  8 : 
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Figure 1 : Relationship between competition  , returns to specialization   and growth Yg  
According to the profit incentive effect, an increase of competition   reduces the price of the 
intermediate good and profit, what determines the incentives to innovation. Therefore, the 
profit incentive effect seems to predict an unambiguously negative relationship between 
product market competition and growth along the entire range of competition intensity. 
Unlike Bianco (2006), an increase of competition reduces the amount of labor devoted to the 
research sector NL  along the entire range of competition intensity. Moreover, an increase of 
competition has no effect on the amount of labor allocated to the final good sector YL  and 
increases the amount of labor in the intermediate goods sector jL . This means that the 
resource allocation effect seems also to predict an unambiguously negative relationship 
between product market competition and growth. Finally, we always have as we can see on 
the above figure a decreasing relationship between competition and growth.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we presented a generalization of Bianco (2006) model in which we disentangle 
the monopolistic mark-up in the intermediate goods sector, the intermediate goods share in 
the final output and the returns to specialization. Our main finding is that the result of the 
Bianco (2006) model that close in an inverted U relationship between competition and growth 
depends critically on the assumptions that there are no differences between these three 
parameters. Indeed, for all values of parameters except to   , we could remove the 
inverted-U relationship between competition and growth. This result is due to the interplay of 
two effects : Schumpeterian and resource allocation effects. In our model, we find that the 
resource allocation effect is always negative which reinforces the Schumpeterian effect on 
growth. Consequently, we find a decreasing relationship between competition and growth. 
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Appendix 
In this appendix, we describe the way followed in order to obtain the main results of this 
paper (23 through 27). Using the equations (3, 4, 7, 8, and 19) and 
L
L
s
j
j   ( AYij ,, ), we 
obtain : 




1
Y
i
s
s .      (30) 
Using the equations (4, 8, 12 and 13), we obtain : 
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Using the equations (16, 23, 24) and the definition of per capita private consumption, the 
previous equation can be re-written as : 
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Plugging the equation (32) into the equation (30), we obtain : 
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Using the condition of equilibrium on the labor market (given by the equation 18), we obtain : 
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From the equations (22, 24 and 34) and assuming that nggg LLL Yi   which is true at the 
steady state, we obtain : 
)).1()1(()1)1((  ngY    (35) 
Plugging the equation (35) into the equation (34), we find : 
).1()1()1(   nnsA     (36) 
Using the equations (35 and 36), we obtain : 
).1)(1(   nsY                 (37) 
Plugging the equations (35 and 36) into the equation (33), we find : 
).1( nsi                    (38) 
Using the equations (16 and 23), we obtain : 
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